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An Introduction to
Cross-Border Practice ABA-Style:
The Agreement Between the ABA and the
Brussels Bars Associations
Laurel S. Terry*
One of the concurrent workshops at the ABA 24th National Conference on
Professional Responsibility was entitled Regulation of Cross-border Practice.
Cross-border legal practice raises a number of issues that increasingly will be
faced by U.S. lawyers and U.S. disciplinary and regulatory authorities. For
example:
Because of increasing globalization, all U.S. lawyers should expect that at
some time during their careers, they will represent a client with interests
outside the U.S. or that they will come into contact with foreign lawyers or
foreign parties. How do a U.S. lawyer's ethical obligations change, if at all,
when the U.S. lawyer has to act in an international arena? 1 Should ABA
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5 be amended to address these
international situations?
Currently Rule 5.4 prevents multidisciplinary partnerships between
lawyers and accountants. Could the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) override an individual U.S. state's ethics rules on this point by finding such "MDP" bans to be
anti-competitive? 2
*Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of Penn State University. This article is based
on Laurel S. Terry, A Case Study of the Hybrid Model for Facilitating Cross-Border Legal Practice:
The Agreement Between the American Bar Association and the Brussels Bars, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.
J. 1382 (1997-98) (hereafter Terry, ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement). This The ProfessionalLawyer
article contains relatively few citations since complete citations and references, together with a
copy of the ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement, are found in the Fordham article.
1. See, e.g., Timothy E. Powers, Ethical Considerations in International Business
Transactions, 1995 SYMPOSIUM ISSUE OF TiiE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 81; Roger J. Goebel,
ProfessionalResponsibilityIssues in InternationalLaw Practice,29 AM. J. CoMp. L. 1 (1981).
2.
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations produced a group of multilateral trade
agreements. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 9 [hereinafter Uruguay Round]. This group includes, but is not limited
to: 1) an agreement creating the World Trade Organization [WTO]; 2) the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [GATT 1994]; 3) the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property [TRIPS]; and 4) the General Agreement on Trade in Services, commonly
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Does the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) give a
Canadian lawyer the right to be admitted to practice in a U.S. state with3
out taking the state bar exam? Should it?
Note that in many ways, it is now easier for a German lawyer to practice
law in France than it is for a California lawyer to practice law in
Pennsylvania. Does the U.S. system of state-based licensing work effectively? Do U.S. lawyers and regulators have anything to learn from the
4
European Union experience?
Does a British or other foreign law firm have the right to open a branch
office in a U.S. state? What kind of law, if any, should a British lawyer be
able to practice in the U.S.? Should individual states that have not yet done
so adopt verbatim the ABA Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal
5
Consultants?
referred to as GATS. GATS is found in Annex II of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, I.E.L. I-B-64 (1994). The United States
Congress enacted legislation to implement the WTO and annexed agreements, such as GATS, but
did not ratify them as a treaty. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108
Stat. 4809 (December 8, 1994).
For a more detailed explanation of GATS, see Terry, ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement, supra note
1, at nn. 23-42 and accompanying text. Some commentators have raised the issue of whether the
federal government has authority to adopt GATS and NAFTA. Compare Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free Form Method in Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1223 (1995) with Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is
NAFTA Constitutional?(1995).
3. NAFTA is an acronym for the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993); see also North American Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (implementing NAFTA into US
law.) For an explanation of these standards, see Terry, ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement, supra note
1, at nn. 45-55 and accompanying text.
It does not take much imagination to predict that someone will rely on GATS or NAFTA in
order to challenge a specific U.S. state regulation of lawyers. Indeed, a Canadian lawyer already
has challenged Nebraska's refusal to grant reciprocity to her Canadian law degree. See
Application of Collins, 561 N.W2d 209 (Neb. 1997). Although this action was unsuccessful, one
wonders what the result would have been had NAFTA or the U.S. implementing statutes conferred standing on the Canadian lawyer-applicant.
4. See Directive 98/5/EC of 16 Feb. 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer
on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained,
Oj. L 77/36 (3/14/98). See generally Terry, ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement, supra note 1, at note
19 and accompanying text.
5.
See American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Report to the
House of Delegates, Model Rule for Licensing of Legal Consultants, 28 INT'L L. 207 at 216, n.23
(1994) (hereafter ABA FLC Report). This Model Rule has been partially, but not completely successful. See Carol L. Needham, The Licensing of Foreign Legal Consultants in the United States,
21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. - (1997-98).
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The examples listed above represent the tip of the iceberg of issues facing
lawyers and policymakers throughout the world. On the one hand, the topic of
"Cross-border Legal Practice" may seem quite esoteric and not of particularly
broad interest to lawyers attending the 24th National Conference on Professional
Responsibility. On the other hand, the rapidly evolving area of "Cross-Border
Legal Practice," of which most regulators and lawyers are unaware, could profoundly affect many of the other topics that were considered at the 24th National
Conference. For example, the plenary session topic of "Multidisciplinary
Partnerships: Accounting Firms and the Practice of Law" likely will be profour.dly affected by what occurs elsewhere in the world as part of cross-border
legal practice regulation. The Big Six accounting firms already have more lawyers
6
outside the U.S. than in the U.S. and constitute the largest law firms in Europe;
this "fait accompli" in Europe may influence the treatment of MDP's by U.S.
courts though it should be noted that a lower court judgment in the Netherlands
upheld the Dutch Bar Association's rule banning such "MDP's," a decision that
has been appealed by the lawyers working at the Price Waterhouse and Arthur
Andersen-affiliated law firms. 7 Moreover, in my view, the issue of MDP's ultimately will require U.S. regulators and courts to define the term "unauthorized
practice of law" in a more precise manner than has been done previously, and this
in turn is relevant to the panel session on "Unauthorized Practice of Law and the
In-House Counsel Admission to Practice." I also believe that the phenomenon of
cross-border legal practice will increasingly influence the analysis of how and by
whom U.S. lawyers should be regulated, and that relates directly to the panel sessions on "Proposed Federal Rules of Professional Conduct, Communications
with Person Represented by Counsel," and the Commission on Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000) project. Moreover, as more and
The International Bar Association or IBA recently adopted a policy concerning Foreign Legal
Consultants or FLC's. Leading the IBA's FLC effort was Ben Greer, a U.S. lawyer practicing with
the Atlanta firm of Alston and Bird. The IBA Committee's initial approach was to develop
detailed FLC Guidelines, not dissimilar to the ABA Model Rule. After this "Guidelines"
approach failed to obtain broad support, the Committee drafted a short Proposed Statement of
Principles on Licensing of Foreign Consultants which recognizes that not all countries approve of
the limited licensing approach represented by an FLC rule, The IBA's Statement of Principles was

approved by the IBA Council on June 6, 1998 in Vienna. Telephone Interview with Bernard L.
Greer, Jr., Chair, IBA FLC Committee (June 10, 1998); see also Terry, ABA/Brussels Bars
Agreement, supra note 1, at note 9 and accompanying text.

6.
7.

See Phillipa Cannon, The Big Six Move In, 50 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 25 (Nov. 1997).
See Accountants Lose Dutch Bar Case, INT'L FIN, L,Rcv. 4 (March 1997); March 18, 1998

Letter from Johan Boeren, Price Waterhouse Lawyers and Legal Consultants, Amsterdam, to
Laurel S. Terry; and Laurel S. Terry, What If... ? The Consequences of Court Invalidationof MDP
Batts, in Proceedings of the 1998 Conference of the Southwestern Legal Foundation Symposium

on Private Investments Abroad (forthcoming) (containing translation of the Dutch case upholding the Netherlands' MDP ban); American Bar Association 24th National Conference on
Professional Responsibility, Conference Coursebook Tab 1 (1998).
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more clients become involved in globalization and methods of doing business that
differ from those in the U.S., the panel session on "Conducting an Internal
Corporate Investigation" is likely to be of increasing importance. Finally, the
panel session on "Teaching Ethics' in Professional Schools" is implicated. For
example, after I presented a recent "Lunch and Learn" session about my upcoming sabbatical project concerning German lawyer/accountant MDP's, my faculty
colleagues commented that my topic had profound implications for legal education because the delivery of legal services, and thus the market for our graduates,
may fundamentally change.
To date, the U.S. response largely has resided with the ABA and the ABA's
response to cross-border legal practice largely has been shaped by a relatively
small group of individuals or constituents, acting for the most part without the
input of a significant number of lawyers or regulators. Moreover, most of those
acting on behalf of the ABA have been lawyers in private practice who have a
vested interest in obtaining relatively liberal cross-border legal practice rules.
These ABA volunteers have responded to rapidly evolving developments with a
considerable donation of time and effort. Moreover, they have done so in relatively uncharted waters-little guidance has been provided by academics, regulators or prior history. In the words of one U.S. lawyer who has been a major
player in many of the negotiations: "we are making it up as we go along." 8
This article focuses on one of the primary results of the ABA's cross-border
legal practice efforts: The Agreement between the ABA and the Brussels Bars
Associations. The ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement introduces one to the typical
issues that arise in a cross-border legal practice context, including the "hot button"
issues of: 1)scope of practice; 2) applicable ethics rules and discipline; 3) forms of
association; and 4) formalities and rules of admission, including reciprocity.
I.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGREEMENT

The Agreement between the ABA and the two Brussels Bar Councils is the
product of approximately two years of negotiation between six U.S. lawyers and
about the same number of representatives of the Brussels Bars, fifteen meetings
and thirty drafts. The genesis of the Agreement was a July 1992 letter sent to the
ABA president by the president of the Dutch Order of the Brussels Bar, Carl
Bevernage. Mr. Bevernage indicated that he and a colleague from the French
Order of the Brussels Bar would be at the August 1992 ABA Annual Meeting
in San Francisco; he reported that "[o]ur respective Bar Councils have asked us
to seize upon this occasion to discuss with the relevant committee or section of
the ABA the practice rules for American lawyers and law firms in Brussels."
The president of the ABA responded to this letter by asking these Brussels
8. Interview with Joseph P. Griffin, Member, ABA Transnational Law Practice Committee
and ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement Negotiator (February 14, 1997).
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lawyers to brief the ABA's Special Advisory Committee on International
Activities and to meet with the ABA Section of International Law and Practice's
Transnational Legal Practice Committee.
Following the presentatin by the Brussels representatives at the ABA
Annual meeting and upon the recommendation of the Special Advisory
Committee, the ABA president asked Steve C. Nelson and Joseph P. Griffin to
pursue discussions with the Brussels Bars along the lines indicated. Four additional lawyers, chosen to provide geographic balance, firm-size and practice balance, were added to the negotiating team. 9 The Brussels Bars negotiators, like
the ABA negotiators, were private practitioners.
The negotiations were conducted in English and proceeded in three stages.
During the first stage, the parties attempted to negotiate specific language for an
actual agreement. And in June 1993, the parties seemed relatively close to concluding the agreement (then called a "Protocol"). The second stage of the negotiations began in August, 1993 at the ABA Annual Meeting in New York City. At
that time, the Brussels negotiators presented a completely new document entitled
"Heads of Agreement." This document contained the principles to be embodied
in the proposed agreement rather than the actual agreement and was a distillation
of the most important points in the May 1993 drafts of the "Protocol." The ABA
negotiators agreed to this change in procedure because they believed that the
Brussels Bars would have fewer difficulties if they negotiated "Heads of
Agreement" rather than specific agreement language. The parties finalized these
"Heads of Agreement" on January 28, 1993. The third stage of the negotiations
was to draft the actual Agreement language. This stage of the negotiations proceeded quite quickly compared to the earlier negotiations; it took less than three
months for the parties to agree on the specific language of the final Agreement.
During the August 1994 ABA Annual Meeting in New Orleans, the Agreement
was presented to the entire Board of Governors of the ABA, which approved it;
the Agreement was signed on Saturday, August 6, 1994.10
9.
Mr. Nelson and Mr. Griffin were past chairs of the ABA's International Law Section and
were chair and vice-chair, respectively, of the Transnational Legal Practice Committee. In addition to lawyers Griffin, Nelson, the six representatives included John H. Harwood II, who was
with the Brussels office of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; Walter Oberreit, a partner in Cleary
Gottlieb who had practiced law in Brussels for over twenty years, Paul D,Sher, a member of Paul
D. Sher & Associaes, resident in Brussels; and Thomas C. Vinje, who was with Morrison &
Foerster's office in Brussels. Attorneys Nelson and Griffin were designated as co-chairs of the
ABA negotiating team. Of these six, all except Steve Nelson and Joe Griffin were currently based
in Brussels and the two exceptions had both previously resided in Brussels. See Terry,
ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement, supranote 1, at nn. 92-103 and accompanying text.
10. The Agreement was signed by R. William Ide III, President of the ABA; Pierre Legros,
BdIonnier (President) of the French Language Order of the Brussels Bar; and Erik Carre,
Stafhouder (President) of the Dutch Language Order of The Brussels Bar. See id. at n. 137.
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A.

CONSULTATIONS WITH THE

U.S. LEGAL COMMUNITY IN BRUSSELS

The final Agreement did not come as a surprise to the U.S. legal community in Brussels because it had beern regularly consulted during the negotiation
process. When the ABA negotiators first appeared in Brussels, the reaction of
some of the U.S. lawyers based in Brussels was to ask the negotiators "who are
you and who appointed you God?" Many U.S. lawyers in Brussels initially were
resistant to the idea of an agreement because they believed the status quo was fine
and that an agreement was risky. The negotiators responded by telling these
lawyers of the Brussels Bars' threat to have their government enforce stricter standards against U.S. lawyers. ABA negotiators believed, and in their view, ultimately most U.S. lawyers in Brussels were convinced, that it was necessary for U.S.
lawyers to reach an agreement with the Brussels Bars because there was a real risk
that U.S. lawyers would not be permitted to continue practicing as they had been.
The U.S. legal community in Brussels was kept apprised of the status of the
negotiations through periodic meetings which were held shortly before or after
the negotiating sessions. In addition, the ABA negotiating team circulated many
of the agreement drafts to the U.S. legal community in Brussels, seeking input.
Many of the comments and suggestions received were incorporated into the
drafts and negotiating posture of the ABA team. Among other things, the ABA
sought specific details of the Belgian lawyers working in U.S. firms in order to
better negotiate the "transition provisions" which would attempt to "grandfather" in or ease the restrictions on U.S. firms' current arrangements.
The March 1994 report to the ABA Board of Governors was entitled
Absence of Known Opposition and summarized the reaction of the U.S. legal
community in Brussels to the negotiations. While the title may not have been
completely accurate, the paragraph accurately reflected the reaction of U.S.
lawyers in Brussels to the final Agreement, as well as to earlier drafts. For example, following the August 3, 1994 meeting at which the final agreement was circulated, the ABA negotiators received a letter from a U.S. lawyer documenting
his previously-expressed concerns about both the procedure leading to the
Agreement and its substance. With respect to procedure, the lawyer complained
that the negotiations had excluded the Belgian law graduates or jurists who
would be most affected by the Agreement; with respect to substance, this lawyer
complained about the "transition" provisions, which required very senior
Belgianjuristswho were working in U.S. firms to complete a "stage" or "apprenticeship" before they could complete their mandatory registration requirements.
B.

THE MAJOR CONCERNS

The ABA negotiators clearly benefitted from the input of the larger U.S.
legal community in Brussels. Through these discussions, and the discussions
among the ABA negotiating team itself, some key positions emerged very quickly. Some of the most important and difficult issues from the perspective of U.S.
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lawyers in Brussels were: 1) the desire that they not be placed at a disadvantage
in comparison with other law firms in Brussels; 2) maintaining continuity of
their firms, some of which had very senior Belgian lawyers or jurists who were
not registered with the Belgian'Bars; and 3) maintaining their current practices
with respect to advice on EU law.
In contrast, the Belgian concerns included: 1) an interest in having the
Belgian jurists who were working for foreign firms become licensed Belgian
lawyers (i.e., tableau lawyers); 2) the desire that all foreign lawyers in Brussels
register with the Bars and be subject to their ethics rules; and 3) an interest in
protecting Belgian clients and lawyers. The latter two concerns were the basis for
numerous specific proposals, many of which became the subject of lengthy negotiations. Some of the Belgian proposals included limitations on U.S. lawyers'
ability to advise on Belgian law; waiting requirements before U.S. lawyers could
form partnerships or cooperations with tableau lawyers or Belgian apprentice
lawyers, called stagiaires;requirements regarding the training period of stagiaires;
requirements regarding firm names and stationery; mandatory registration; and
submission of firm partnership agreements to the bar, among other issues.
In addition to these key points, many of the negotiators had points that
were of particular importance to them. Joe Griffin, for example, was particularly concerned about the European Court of Justice's AM&S decision, I which
refused to recognize the attorney-client privilege in a situation in which a nonEU attorney was involved. As a result, he lobbied successfully to have language
included which, inter alia, provides that the Brussels Bars will protect and
defend U.S. lawyers' professional privileges. Other negotiators, both ABA and
Belgian, had key points that they wanted included in the Agreement. Thus, part
of the negotiation process was an effort to include these points, address the
underlying concerns, or otherwise ensure that each negotiator would be willing
to support the Agreement. This "horsetrading" effort ultimately was successful
as demonstrated by the signed Agreement.
II. A SUMMARY OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT
The Agreement is ten pages long. It consists of fourteen "Whereas" clauses, which state the background, premises and justifications for the Agreement;
these provisions are followed by fourteen articles. The key to understanding the
Agreement is to realize that it purported to create, for the first time, a mandatory registration requirement for all U.S. lawyers practicing in Brussels. Article 1,
2
requires "Established U.S. Lawyers" to register with one of the Brussels Bars.'
11,

Case 155/79, AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 2 C.M.L.R. 264

(1982).
12. "Established U.S. lawyers" are defined inone of the "Whereas" clauses as those who are
resident or regularly present in Brussels and maintain respective establishments in Brusseis from
which they provide legal services. See 'Ferry, ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement, supra note 1, at nn.
162-167 and accompanying text.
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The parties to this Agreement are the ABA and the two Brussels Bars. The
Brussels Bars are the regulatory bodies that set the rules of professional conduct,
discipline, and otherwise regulate the professional lives of Brussels avocats and
advocaaten, also known as tableau lawyers. Thus, because the Brussels Bars can
regulate the conditions to which their own registered lawyers are subject, they
certainly were and are able to carry out their side of the bargain.
The ABA, however, has no authority to enforce the Agreement language
that U.S. lawyers "shall" register with the Brussels Bars. As the Agreement itself
notes, the ABA has no authority to proscribe the conduct of U.S. lawyers, who
are regulated on a state-wide basis; despite this lack of authority, and in contrast
to the Brussels Bars' agreement with the Law Society of England, the
Agreement is couched as a mandatory registration requirement. Since the ABA
has no power to bind anyone and since the Brussels Bars have no power to regulate foreign lawyers in Brussels who provide legal advice, but do not register
with them, the Agreement itself does not in fact "require" U.S. lawyers in
Brussels to register with the Brussels Bars.
So, if the Agreement is an illusory contract, why were the Brussels Bars
interested in it? One answer to this question is provided in the introductory
provisions: "Whereas . . . [the ABA] can make recommendations to U.S.
Lawyers, and many U.S. lawyers are members of the ABA and abide by the rules
and recommendations of the ABA . . . ." Another explanation may be the
absence of anyone else with whom to negotiate. Moreover, while the ABA may
not have real authority, it may have a certain amount of moral authority in this
context and may be able to convince U.S. lawyers that it would reflect poorly on
the U.S. legal community if that community were to repudiate an agreement
negotiated by the ABA, or that failure to comply with the Agreement could
result in even more stringent conditions imposed by the Belgian authorities in
the form of limitations on the work permits of U.S. lawyers.13
13. Many U.S. lawyers in Brussels benefit from the Agreement because it permits them to be
in partnership with Brussels lawyers, rather than just jurists. On the other hand, the Agreement
offers very little, if anything, to those U.S. lawyers who do not want or need to practice with
licensed Belgian lawyers. This is because in Belgium, lawyers do not have a monopoly on the giving of legal advice. In other words, Belgium does not have unauthorized practice of law provisions
comparable to those in the U.S. Therefore, a U.S. lawyer need not register in order to provide
legal advice and cannot be disciplined by the Brussels Bars if the lawyer is not registered.
Despite these facts, the Brussels Bars and Belgian government have the power to affect U.S.
lawyers' ability to work in.Belgium. For example, during some of the 1960s and 1970s, the Belgian
Government, under pressure from the bar associations, issued work permits or professional cards
to foreign lawyers that contained numerous restrictions, including limitations on the U.S. lawyers'
ability to associate with Belgian lawyers and limitations on the type of law about which the U.S.
lawyer could advise (even though there was no unauthorized practice of law provision). Thus, one
reason for U.S. lawyers voluntarily to comply with the Agreement, even if they obtain no direct
benefit, is to minimize the possibility of having such restrictions imposed once again. See generally id. at nn. 73-86 and 141 and accompanying text.
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The Agreement made mandatory registration more palatable to U.S.
lawyers by having the Brussels Bars create a new third list of lawyers, called the
"Joint List," to supplement the "A List" of Belgian tableau lawyers and the "B
List" of foreign lawyers. The rights and responsibilities of a U.S. lawyer registering with the Brussels Bars differ depending on whether the lawyer chooses to
register on the "B List" (referred to in the Agreement as the "Foreign Lawyer
List") or the newly-created "Joint List." Moreover, unlike some other cross-border arrangements, mandatory registration did not require the U.S. lawyer to
take an examination or satisfy additional requirements, such as length of practice requirements. Although the Agreement provided for registration on either
the B List or the new "Joint List," it created strong incentives for U.S. lawyers
to register on the B List since the B List provides significant benefits over the
Joint List on the key issues of "scope of practice" or type of law the U.S. lawyer
may practice and because of the ability of B List lawyers to employ and be in
partnership with Belgian lawyers.
A.

THE "SCOPE OF PRACTICE" PROVISIONS

One of the most important issues to a lawyer engaged in cross-border practice is the scope or extent of legal practice in which the lawyer may engage. The
regulatory body-assuming there is one-in the Host State must decide whether
the visiting lawyer may advise only on his or her "Home State" law; whether the
visiting lawyer may advise on "international law"; whether the visiting lawyer
may advise on the Host State's own law; or some combination thereof. In addition, the regulatory body must decide whether any areas of law practice are
excluded, whether the visiting lawyer may appear in court, whether the lawyer
may work alone or whether he or she is required to work in conjunction with a
lawyer from that Host State. This scope of practice issue proved to be one of the
most difficult for the parties to resolve and required much negotiation.
Substantively, the Agreement demonstrates a middle-of-the-road approach,
in which the "scope of practice" provisions are neither as broad nor as narrow
as they might be. 14 The key provision permits U.S. B List lawyers to render
advice on all law on which they are competent, except Belgian law; however, a
B List U.S. lawyer can render advice on Belgian law if the lawyer relies on (and
14. The Agreement's primary "scope of practice" provisions are narrower than those in the
EU Establishment Directive, which permits the migrant lawyer to advise on Host State law and
the ABA Model FLC Rule, which does not require the migrant lawyer to identify the Host State
lawyer on whose advice the migrant relies. On the other hand, the Agreement's "scope of practice" provisions are broader than those found in the proposed NAFTA Model FLC Rule and the
IBA's April 1996 rejected FLC Guidelines and the IBA's June, 1998 Statement of [FLC]
Principles, all of which limit the lawyer to advising on Home State and international law. The
scope of practice exceptions found in the Agreement are generally similar to exceptions found in
other cross border legal practice schemes. See id. at nn. 187-189 and 193-200 and accompanying
text and supra note 6.
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identifies) a Belgian tableau lawyer (or approved apprentice). 15 Procedurally,the
Agreement demonstrates an approach that might prove useful when negotiating
parties reach an impasse. The most significant aspect of the Agreement may be
the parties' "agreement to disagred" on the scope of practice issues related to
the practice of European Union law.
While negotiating the Agreement, the parties reached an impasse on how
the practice of European Union law should be viewed. The Belgians considered
it to be part of "Belgian law," analogous to U.S. federal law, such that it should
be included within the "scope of practice provisions" cited above, requiring
U.S. lawyers to work in consultation with Belgian lawyers. The U.S. lawyers, in
contrast, considered EU law to be international law, not governed by the
"Belgian Law" scope of practice provisions.
Neither side was willing to yield on this issue and both sides considered the
issue a "dealbreaker." The parties ultimately resolved this issue relatively late in
the negotiations when they finally "agreed to disagree" on this point.
Accordingly, much effort was spent negotiating the precise language of the paragraph which sets forth this "agreement to disagree" found in the "scope of practice" provisions. As an aside, it should be noted that the ABA negotiators were
told that the the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community (CCBE), which considers itself the European Community's bar
association, was unhappy with the Brussels Bars for this concession; the CCBE
believed that reasonable minds could not differ on this point and that the
Brussels Bars should not have conceded.
B.

ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY ISSUES

A second major issue addressed in the Agreement is the topic of ethics and
discipline. One of the motivating factors for the Brussels Bars was the desire to
regulate foreign lawyers practicing in Brussels and to subject them to the
Brussels ethics rules. On the one hand, the ABA negotiators understood how
important this issue was to the Belgians and wanted to comply; on the other
hand, the ABA negotiators were sensitive to the concerns that some U.S. lawyers
might have with respect to this issue, especially those who had not previously
registered with a Brussels bar and who had no Belgian jurists in their offices.
Accordingly, the final agreement treats B List and Joint List lawyers differently. The B List lawyers receive more "scope of practice" rights than do Joint
15.

The authority given to aJoint List lawyer ismuch narrower. First, aJoint List lawyer may

advise only on "matters involving ancillary issues of Belgian law." When the Joint List lawyer does
so, the advice must be based on the advice of, and rendered in consultation with, a Belgian tableau
lawyer or a stagiairwith one year's experience, although there is no requirement that this Belgian
lawyer be identified. This provision also was the subject of much negotiation. See Terry,
ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement, supra note 1,at nn. 184-186 and accompanying text.
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List lawyers, but also face more responsibilities in the form of ethics rules to
which they are bound and the discipline to which they are subject.
With one exception that is specifically set forth, B List lawyers are bound
by all of the Brussels Bars' rules of ethics, provided that they are appiied in
accordance with the principles set forth in the CCBE Code of Conduct. 16 The
exception is that unlike tableau lawyers and stagiaires,B List lawyers are permitted to have the status of employees in a law firm or partnership.
The "employee" exception is justified on the grounds that the independence of U.S. lawyers is guaranteed by the rules of professional conduct of the
U.S. bar to which they belong. Since Brussels lawyers also are subject to rules
regarding independence, however, one might wonder whether this differential
treatment of U.S. and Belgian lawyers will create pressure to change the Brussels
ethics rules. If Belgian lawyers see B List lawyers who are employees of law
firms, and ifthe Belgian lawyers believe that the independence of these lawyers
is not compromised by their employment status, that might lead the Belgian
lawyers to question the premises of their local bar rules and to press for change
so that they too could be employees of a firm.
If a B List lawyer violates any of the applicable Brussels Bars' ethics rules,
then the Agreement provides that the B List lawyer is subject to discipline by
the Brussels Bars. Although the Agreement subjects B List lawyers to the
Brussels Bars' discipline systems, the Agreement also provides a dispute resolution mechanism. The Agreement establishes a committee, called the Joint
Supervisory Committee, which consists of representatives of the ABA and the
two Brussels bar associations. Among other things, the Agreement specifies that
at the request of either the ABA or the Brussels Bars, any disciplinary dispute
involving lawyers covered by the Agreement be submitted to, and if possible,
resolved by the Joint Supervisory Committee.
In addition to the Joint Supervisory Committee, the Agreement contains a
second requirement that might act as something of a safety valve before one of
the Brussels Bars imposes discipline. The Agreement states that if it is determined that a U.S. lawyer has breached a Brussels Bar rule, which may be in
irreconcilable conflict with a U.S. ethics rule to which the lawyer is subject, the
Brussels Bar "shall invite and consider" the views of the ABA or relevant State
Bar before imposing sanctions"; the Brussels Bar nonetheless retains the
absolute right to discipline B List lawyers who violate its rules. Although the
Agreement does not specify who makes the determination of the existence of an
16.

For a discussion of the CCBE Code of Ethics, see generally Laurel S. Terry, An

Introductionto the European Community's Legal Ethics Code PartI An Analysis of the CCBE Code
of Conduct,7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1993) and Laurel S. Terry, An Introductionto the European

Community's Legal Ethics Code Part H: Applying the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEo. J.LEGAL
ETHICS 345 (1993).
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"irreconcilable conflict," the Joint Supervisory Committee, together with the
lawyer in question, presumably would play a role in defining this situation.
In contrast to B List lawyers, Joint List lawyers are bound by the rules
found in the CCBE Code of Conduct except in situations where they would conflict with the U.S. ethics rules to which the U.S. lawyer is bound. Moreover,
Joint List lawyers are not subject to discipline by the Brussels Bars for violation
of these ethics rules; the only sanctions that are available are "suspension or
deregistration" from the Joint List and referral of the issue to the Joint List
lawyer's Home State discipline authorities. Once again, however, the Agreement
permits either the ABA or the Brussels Bars to invoke the Joint Supervisory
Committee to see if it can resolve the problem.
This rather flexible "dispute-resolution" approach, which is used for both
B List and Joint List lawyers, is quite different than the approach initially contemplated. Initially, the ABA negotiators envisioned an appendix to the
Agreement that would identify the CCBE or Brussels ethics provisions with
which a U.S. lawyer need not comply. The ABA negotiators sought outside assistance on this point from various academics, including Professors Roger Goebel
and Mary Daly of Fordham University School of Law, and this author. Based on
a seventeen page memo from this author about possible conflicts among the
CCBE Code of Conduct, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and
other U.S. state ethics rules, the ABA negotiators developed such an appendix.
They continued to use this appendix approach to the issue of conflicts through
several drafts. The ABA and Brussels negotiators ultimately decided that the
flexibility of the Joint Supervisory Committee's dispute resolution approach was
more desirable than the rigidity of the Appendix approach. Although Joe Griffin
reported that the ABA team found it amusing to try to imagine various scenarios that would give rise to irreconcilable conflicts, they thought it likely that the
first irreconcilable conflict to arise would be one they had not contemplated.
Moreover, by the time the Appendix approach was abandoned, the ABA negotiators had built up enough trust in their Brussels counterparts as a result of their
year of negotiations, so that the flexible Committee seemed desirable. Thus, the
final Agreement makes the Joint Supervisory Committee available both for B
List lawyer disputes and Joint List lawyer disputes.
In addition to the general provisions on conduct and discipline described
above, two more specific provisions are found in these sections. First, the
Agreement obligates the Brussels Bars to protect and defend the professional
privileges of U.S. lawyers in the same manner as they defend the professional
privileges of their own members. The second additional provision found in the
"conduct" and "discipline" sections is a non-discrimination provision. This
rather innocuous-looking provision represents the evolution of the negotiations;
in early drafts of the Agreement, U.S. lawyers were subject to different bar rules
than were other foreign lawyers on the B-List. The Brussels Bars, for example,
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wanted U.S. lawyers to wait three years before forming a partnership with a
tableau lawyer, even though other foreign lawyers on the B-List were not subject to this rule. This provision represents the ultimate success of the ABA negotiators in convincing the Brussels Bars that as a general rule, U.S. lawyers should
not be subject to stricter rules than the other lawyers in Brussels.
There are two other provisions, not located in the "Conduct and
Privileges" section of the Agreement, which nevertheless should be considered
to be "ethics" provisions. One provision specifies that the trust account rules
apply only to B List lawyers in a partnership or cooperation with tableaulawyers
or stagiaires, and only with respect to matters having a primary nexus with
Belgium. Another provision provides that B List lawyers must comply with the
Brussels Bars' requirements about professional liability insurance, but may do
so by providing written assurances that the U.S. lawyer has the level of coverage
called for by the requirements.
As noted earlier, the Agreement contains rules concerning discipline, as
well as provisions specifying the appropriate conduct. Since cross-border practice is involved, however, conflicts of laws issues inevitably arise with respect to
discipline. In comparison to other cross-border practice situations, the conflicts
of laws provisions in the Agreement are deceptively simple: if a B List lawyer
violates a rule of the Brussels Bar, then the lawyer is responsible for that violation, regardless of whether that rule conflicts with any other rule to which the
lawyer is subject. Conversely, if a lawyer is on the Joint List, and if the Brussels
rule conflicts with a U.S. ethics rule to which the lawyer is subject, the U.S. rule
takes precedence. Although this straightforward approach has advantages,
there also are drafting ambiguities that may very well have to be resolved at a
later date. The advantage of this approach is that it appears to provide a clear,
straightforward decision on the "conflicts" issue. This is in contrast, for example, to certain CCBE Code of Conduct or EU Establishment Directive provisions that do not say which rule to use should two rules conflict. This also is in
contrast to the approach used in revised ABA Model RuLe of Professional
Conduct 8.5, which, in certain circumstances, does not provide a clear rule, but
instead requires the lawyer to use the rules of the jurisdiction in which the
lawyer's conduct has "its predominant effect."
This simplistic approach, however, may not turn out to be workable in
18
practice. 17 Moreover, the Agreement itself suggests some drafting ambiguities.
17.

See generallySymposium: Ethics and the MultijurisdictionalPracticeof Law, 36 S.TEX, L.

REV. 657 (1995).

18. For example, the Agreement requires U.S. B List lawyers to use the Brussels ethics rules
with respect to his or her practice "within and relating to Belgium." In contrast, the Agreement
requires U.S. Joint List lawyers to use the Brussels ethics rules with respect to his or her practice

"within or relating to Belgium." Issues could thus arise concerning: 1) the significance, if any,
between the use of "and relating" for B List lawyers, and "or relating" for Joint List lawyers; 2)
the difficulty of defining "within" Belgium in the age of telecommunications; and 3) the difficul-
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The dispute-resolution mechanism of the Joint Supervisory Committee, however, may make these conflicts issues less thorny than they otherwise would be.
Lawyers may be more comfortable with the possibility of conflicting provisions
when they know their conduct will'be reviewed by a committee with representatives from both jurisdictions, rather than by representatives who have an interest in enforcing their own provisions.
In sum, the ethics and discipline provisions in the Agreement do not differ
profoundly from the provisions found in other cross-border arrangements.' 9
The legislative history, however, suggests that the Agreement negotiators may
have considered these issues with a degree of particularity and a level of consideration that has not occurred previously. The bilateral nature of the Agreement
may have permitted the parties to anticipate the likely issues with a degree of
specificity not possible in a multilateral agreement. Once again, the most innovative aspect of the Agreement may be procedural, namely its dispute resolution
mechanism for resolving concerns over ethics and discipline. Time will tell, but
the flexible dispute-resolution approach may represent a new and interesting
way to deal with the issue of conflicts in ethics rules, rather than simply subjecting the established lawyer to the Host State's discipline. At the same time that
the dispute-resolution provisions promote flexibility, the rather rigid ethics and
discipline provisions may provide needed clarity as to the applicable rules.
C. TfIE "FoRMs OF AssOcIATION" RULES
The "forms of association" rules in the Agreement, like the "scope of practice" provisions, provide distinct advantages to U.S. lawyers who register on the
B List rather than on the Joint List. The Agreement authorizes U.S. lawyers who
register on the B List to form, at any time, "Partnerships with Tableau Lawyers"
and "Cooperations with Stagiair[e]s and/or Tableau Lawyers." In contrast, U.S.
lawyers who choose to register on the Joint List are not permitted to form
Cooperations or become Partners with stagiairesor tableau lawyers.
The Agreement thus grants U.S. lawyers three of the items they wanted: 1)
the ability to become partners with Belgian tableau lawyers without a waiting
period of three years, as initially proposed by the Belgians; 2) the ability to
employ and work with Belgian stagiaires;and 3) the ability to work with Belgian
stagiaireswithout a waiting period of one-two years, as proposed by the Belgians
once they agreed that U.S. lawyers could hire Belgian stagiaires.These points
had been the subject of much negotiation, and represented clear victories for
the ABA. In return, however, the Brussels Bars got something they wanted since
ty of defining "relating to Belgium." See Terry, ABA/Brussels Bar Agreement, supra note 1, at nn.
227-228 and accompanying text.
19. Most recent cross border practice schemes that address ethics and discipline require the
migrant lawyer to comply with the Host State's ethics rules and discipline system. See id. at nn.
229-240 and accompanying text.
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the Agreement provides that "[s]ubject to the transitional provisions of Article
12, U.S. lawyers shall not form or maintain Cooperations with Belgian Jurists."
A similar provision prohibits U.S. lawyers from becoming partners with Belgian
jurists. Moreover, although the Brussels Bars abandoned their position that a
one-year waiting period was required before a U.S. lawyer could cooperate with
a stagiair,the Agreement does provide that a U.S. lawyer may not rely on a stagiairwith less than one year's experience for advice on Belgian law.
The Agreement also is significant because it permits stagiair and tableau
lawyers to cooperate with, or be partners of, the entire U.S. law firm provided
that two conditions are satisfied. (The two conditions are that all lawyers in the
firm who are or become established in Brussels must register on the B List, and
one of the firm lawyers who registers on the B List must be a partner.) This provision thus stands in contrast to requirements in some countries, such as Mexico,
which do not permit the local lawyers to be partners with an entire U.S. firm.
Because the Agreement permits U.S. lawyers to form cooperations with
Belgian apprentices or stagiairesand because the Agreement does not require
the U.S. lawyer to associate with a registered Belgian tableau lawyer, one of the
issues facing the Agreement drafters was what to do about the Belgian patron,
who is the stagiair or apprentice lawyer's mentor. After negotiation, the drafters
agreed that any tableau lawyer, including lawyers outside the firm, could serve
as the mentor or patron of the Belgian stagiair.
In addition to these key provisions, the Agreement contains many provisions that specify in detail the nature of these arrangements, including officesharing arrangements, multi-national partnerships or MNP's, stationery requirements and the manner in which a firm utilizing such cooperations or partnerships should hold itself out to the world. (The Agreement permits a U.S. law
firm to "carry on its practice in Brussels under the name that it uses in the
United States" provided that the firm has at least one partner-U.S. or
Belgian-in the Brussels office.)
On the one hand, one could argue that regulation should not operate at
this level of detail, but should be left to the marketplace. On the other hand,
from the perspective of the lawyers engaged in cross-border practice, it may be
desirable to negotiate an Agreement on these kinds of mundane points so that
the firm knows exactly what the position of the regulators will be and thus
knows exactly where it stands, Indeed, the importance of these "firm name" and
"stationery" issues to the negotiators is demonstrated by the fact it required
approximately one year for the parties to resolve these issues.
Two additional sets of provisions related to the "form of association"
proved quite controversial in the negotiations. The first group of provisions was
the transitional provisions found in Article 12. The problem was that, on the
one hand, U.S. firms in Brussels wanted to ensure their ability to continue with
their existing personnel with minimal disruption. On other hand, the Brussels
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Bars wanted to stop U.S. firms from employing Belgian jurists and did not want
to compromise on the training period or "stage" that normally would be
required before a Belgian jurist could become a tableau lawyer. Nor did the
Brussels Bars want a different set of rules for tableau lawyers working in a U.S.
firm than for other tableau lawyers.
The "grandfathering" compromise that was reached is quite detailed and
the result of much input from the U.S. firms in Brussels, many of whom were trying to address the situation of a specific lawyer or lawyers in their offices. This
article will not summarize all of these details. In a nutshell, however, the
Agreement "grandfathers" in partnerships and cooperations existing shortly
before the Agreement was signed. U.S. lawyers who were partners with Belgian
jurists in June 1994 when the Agreement was finalized were allowed to continue
that partnership with that individual. The jurist, however, was required to register as a stagiairand serve the training period. (This partnership is permitted as
part of the "transition" even though the Agreement otherwise forbids partnerships between U.S. lawyers and stagiaires.) Moreover, U.S. lawyers are permitted
to form new partnerships, even with Belgian jurists-turned-stagiaires,provided
that the U.S. lawyer was in cooperation with the jurist in June 1994, and provided the cooperation lasted three years. The Agreement further provides that if a
Belgian jurist who is licensed in the U.S. was resident outside Belgium (for example, practicing law in New York), then the Belgianjurist can continue his or her
partnership or cooperative arrangement with a U.S. firm provided that the jurist
registers on the tableau or stagiairlist when the jurist moves back to Brussels.
Without these "transition provisions," the Agreement probably could not
have been completed. Unless the specific situations of the various lawyers and
firms were addressed, the ABA negotiators undoubtedly would have lost the
support of U.S. firms in Brussels, and thus would have lost their credibility. By
the end of the negotiations, both sides appeared to be relatively satisfied. At the
close of the negotiations, the Brussels Bars made available the names of Brussels
lawyers who could offer advice to stagiaires and suggested that the training period could be adjusted to suit the more senior status of the jurists, some of whom
had been practicing law for years. These efforts appear to have been relatively
successful. Although precise numbers are not available, one expert estimated
that as of March, 1997, eighty U.S. lawyers had registered with the Brussels Bars
for a registration rate of fifty percent, almost all of whom registered on a B List;
this was a sharp increase over the handful of lawyers who had registered prior
to the Agreement.20
The final provision related to the "forms of association" also was quite controversial. One of the "Administration" provisions of the Agreement requires
U.S. lawyers who form partnerships with tableau lawyers to do two things. First,
20.

See id. at nn. 304-311 and accompanying text.
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they must submit to the Brussels Bar, with whom they register, for approval, the
agreement between the U.S. lawyer(s) and the tableau lawyer(s) concerning the
formation of any partnership. Second, the U.S. lawyers must submit for information purposes the partnership agreement among themselves, or, if no written
agreement exists, a written confirmation that the partnership agreement does
not conflict with the provisions of their agreement with the tableau lawyers.
According to ABA negotiator Joe Griffin, some Belgians had heard stories
of Belgian partners who were treated like second-class citizens in foreign firms.
Since the heads of the Brussels Bars have power under their rules to examine
partnership agreements and intervene in the event of a dispute, some of the
Belgians wanted to have this same power with respect to the partnerships
between U.S. and Brussels lawyers. Many of the U.S. lawyers, however, were
quite disturbed by this prospect. Joe Griffin, for example, reports that one of the
U.S. lawyers in Brussels stated that he wouldn't even show his partnership agreement to God! Some other U.S. lawyers in Brussels said they were forbidden by
their partnership agreements from showing it to anyone, even their spouses.
When the U.S. lawyers checked, however, they discovered that the Brussels Bars'
rules did give them the right to see these partnership agreements.
After learning more about the concerns of the Belgians and the importance
of this issue to some of the Belgian negotiators, the ABA negotiators were willing to agree to this rather striking provision. The ABA negotiators were willing
to do so based on their belief that the discrimination situation that concerned
the Belgians would not arise often, if at all; there was a safety valve in the form
of the Joint Supervisory Committee; and the fact that many firms will have a
summary of their Partnership Agreement they submit for tax purposes that
would be sufficient to satisfy the Belgian requirements. And, as it turns out, this
provision has not proven to be a great problem since the Agreement was signed.
Judged from the perspective of the migrant U.S. Lawyer, this Agreement
contains among the most liberal "forms of association" provisions among the
various cross-border legal practice schemes. 2 1 Other than the obligation to submit one's partnership agreement, the "forms of association" provisions do not
treat B List and Joint List lawyers substantially different than Belgian tableau
lawyers. What may be most notable about the Agreement, however, is the abil21. The "forms of association" provisions in the Agreement are substantially similar to the
ABA Model FLC Rule. They are substantially more liberal than the pending NAFTA Model Rule
that permits U.S. lawyers to form partnerships with Mexican lawyers, but requires Mexican
lawyers to maintain the majority interest in such a firm. The Agreement also is more liberal than
the IBA's Rejected FLC Guidelines and the Statement of Principles it adopted because the
Agreement permits U.S. lawyers who are employees to work in a Brussels office, whereas the IBA
Guidelines reserve to the Host Authority the right to prohibit this. Even the EU Establishment
Directive, which generally is quite liberal, seems to allow EU countries to prohibit lawyers from
serving as employees in a firm. Indeed, with respect to the employment status of U.S. lawyers, the
Agreement permits U.S. lawyers to do something which Brussels lawyers cannot do. See id. at nn.
279-287 and accompanying text.
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ity of the parties to negotiate the detailed "transition" or "grandfathering" provisions that attempted to address the concerns of all parties, while still reaching
an agreement. The ability of the parties to compromise and to treat Belgian
jurists differently depending on wh~ther they were employed by, or partners in,
U.S. law firms before the Agreement was signed may be one of the Agreement's
most interesting and creative aspects.
D. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
In addition to the "scope of practice," "ethics and discipline" and "association" rules, the Agreement has additional rules which can be characterized as
"miscellaneous provisions." These include a requirement that fees be reasonable; another nondiscrimination provision; a statement that all three language
versions of the Agreement are authentic; provisions about the effective date and
termination requirements; and an "implementation" section that establishes the
Joint Supervisory Committee and its responsibilities.
The most interesting of these miscellaneous provisions probably is Article
13, entitled "Reciprocity." The Agreement obligates the ABA to use its best
efforts to ensure that Brussels lawyers have access to the U.S. legal market. The
Agreement further provides that after a three-year period, the Brussels Bars will
be free to impose restrictions on U.S. lawyers from states that have not implemented a foreign legal consultant rule. "Reciprocity" often is a contentious issue
when lawyers or countries attempt to negotiate cross-border practice agreements.22 Here too, "reciprocity" was the subject of some disagreement. The
Agreement's handling of the issue is interesting since it postponed the evaluation of reciprocity until after the Agreement had been in place for several years,
perhaps postponing or avoiding entirely some of the battles that have paralyzed
other agreements. Moreover, because neither side initiated a meeting, the three
year review period passed without a review. While the ABA negotiators expect
to meet to schedule a meeting to discuss the Agreement's status, they do not
anticipate any problems on this basis. 23
22. See, e.g., ABA FLC Report, supra note 6, at 225, n.51 (adopting a reciprocity requirement, but noting that reciprocity is inconsistent with a fundamental tenet of international trade
law under [GATS]); Terry, ABA/Brussels BarsAgreement, supra note 1, at n. 296 (citing a summary of different countries' objections to the reciprocity requirement in the IBA Rejected FLC
Guidelines).
23. Telephone Interview with Steven Nelson, ABA Negotiator (March 18, 1998); see also
Terry, ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement, supra note 1, at nn. 298-363 and accompanying text concerning Implementation of the Agreement. The ABA considers that it has satisfied this reciprocity provision by virtue of its promulgation and ongoing endorsement of the Model Rule for the
Licensing of Legal Consultants and by having offered to negotiate for Brussels lawyers with any
state in which Brussels lawyers sought admission and encountered difficulties. See id. at notes 35152 and accompanying text. For a discussion of U.S. state implementation of the ABA Model FLC
Rule, see Needham, supra note 6.

AN INTRODUCTION TO CROSS-BORDER PRACTICE ABA-STYLE

35

VI. CONCLUSION

Cross-border legal practice schemes clearly have the potential to affect
both "Wall Street" lawyers engaged in cross-border practice and also "Main
Street" lawyers who increasingly represent clients who are personally involved
in globalization or who have dealings with those who are involved in globalization.2 4 However, in my view, cross-border legal practice schemes have the
potential to affect every lawyer in the U.S. and every state disciplinary and regulatory authority because they increase the likelihood that the "rules of the
game" will change, and that U.S. lawyers will be regulated on a national or international basis, rather than on a state-wide basis.
Despite the potential impact of cross-border legal practice schemes such as
GATS and NAFTA, there appears to have been remarkably little interest in
these schemes by state regulators and by the general population of lawyers.
Instead, the U.S. response to cross-border legal practice has been formulated by
a relatively small number of lawyers, primarily from the ABA, who have donated their time and energy.
The time has come for more lawyers to become aware of these cross-border practice schemes and to engage in a dialogue concerning the appropriate
basis of regulation, if any. I believe it is particularly important for state disciplinary and regulatory bodies to participate in this dialogue since they are the ones
whose rules may be changed and whose jurisdiction may be curtailed. This is a
particularly appropriate time to begin this dialogue since the GATS Working
25
Party on Professional Services will soon turn its attention to legal services.
24. See Mary Daly, Practicing Across Borders: Ethical Reflections for Small Firm and Solo
Practitioners, 1995 SYMPOSIUM ISSUE OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 123 (ABA 1995).
25. Among other things, GATS requires all signatory countries to inform the WTO bodies

concerning their measures for the authorization, licensing or certification of service providers.
GATS further encourages a Member to recognize the education and experience obtained,
requirements met, oi" licenses granted in another country on a unilateral or multilateral basis.

GATS also provides that "[i]n appropriate cases, Members shall work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations towards the establishment and
adoption of common international standards and criteria for recognition and common interna-

tional standards for the practice of relevant services trades and professions."
In order to fulfill these provisions, a Working Party on Professional Services was created. This
Working Party has the obligation to examine and report, with recommendations, on the disciplines necessary to ensure that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures,
technical standards and licensing requirements in the field of professional services do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade, In 1994, the GATS Working Party on Professional Services
determined that the accountancy sector should be considered first. That report has now been
completed and is found at http://wto.org/ wto/news/press73.htm (visited 3/17/1998). The

Working Party has indicated that legal services are to be considered once work on the accountancy sector is completed. To date, there are no published reports of the efforts of the Working
Party with respect to legal services. Neither GATS nor NAFTA themselves established a system
for directly regulating cross-border legal practce; instead they delegated to a working party the
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Thus, in my view, the ABA/Brussels Bars Agreement is important not only
because it provides practice rights for U.S. lawyers in Brussels, but also because
it can provide a useful introduction to U.S. lawyers of many of the issues that
arise in cross-border legal practice schemes and that ultimately may change the
way law in the U.S. is practiced and regulated.

obligation to further develop cross-border legal practice standards. See Terry, ABA/Brussels Bar
Agreement, supra note 1, at nn. 37-44 and accompanying text.

